The EU-Mercosur Agreement is a trade and a political agreement between the European Union and the Mercosur bloc: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. If ratified, it would become one of the world’s largest free trade areas, covering more than 780 million people. Negotiations began in 1999 and were politically concluded in 2019, but final ratification is still pending.

Because it promotes a trade model that benefits large corporations at the expense of people, farmers, and the environment. It would:

  • Boost deforestation and greenhouse-gas emissions;
  • Undermine small farmers and food sovereignty;
  • Reward agribusiness and extractive industries linked to human-rights violations;

Deepen inequality and dependence on export-oriented production.

The trade pillar removes or reduces tariffs on:

  • Beef, soy, sugar, ethanol, poultry and other agricultural goods from Mercosur;
  • Cars, chemicals such as pesticides and plastics, machinery, and industrial goods from the EU.

In practical terms, the deal:

  • Grants Mercosur exporters an additional yearly quota of 99,000 tonnes of beef, 180,000 tonnes of sugar, and 650,000 tonnes of ethanol access to the EU market, much of it produced in deforestation-risk areas.
  • Eliminates tariffs on over 90% of EU exports to Mercosur, including cars (35% tariff today), chemicals (up to 18%), and machinery.

Facilitates the export of EU pesticides banned in Europe to Mercosur countries, which are then used in producing food imported back to the EU.

The EU-Mercosur agreement has not yet been signed. The European Commission and the Mercosur countries presented the results of their negotiations in December 2024. Then the text went through legal scrubbing and translation in all EU official languages. The text must still go through approval by EU Member States, the European Parliament, and Mercosur national parliaments before being ratified.

The European Commission presents the final text to EU Member States.

  • EU Council vote (expected late 2025).
  • European Parliament vote
  • Votes in Mercosur national parliaments.
  • Final ratification if all sides approve.

The EU-Mercosur agreement consists of a “trade pillar” and a “political and cooperation pillar”. In 1999 it was agreed upon that both pillars form part of the agreement. By EU rules, if both pillars had to be voted upon, it would have to be unanimously. Since France, Austria and other countries have voiced their opposition to the deal, the European Commission is looking for another ratification process, the so-called ‘splitting’. The two pillars of the agreement will be separated, so that the trade pillar can be adopted as a separate interim agreement by the Council with a qualified majority, bypassing national vetoes. More information here.

If there is no majority in favor of EU-Mercosur in the Council and/or in the European Parliament, then the deal will be blocked.

  • Council vote

Even if the European Commission chooses to go for the splitting of EU-Mercosur, it is still possible to block the deal during the vote of the Council representing the 27 member states. If at least four EU countries representing 35 % of the EU population oppose it, a blocking minority can stop the process. Countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Poland have expressed opposition or strong concerns against EU-Mercosur. Public pressure is essential to keep their opposition and to convince more EU countries to abstain or vote no to EU-Mercosur. Then, a blocking minority made by at least 4 countries representing 35% of the population, could stop the ratification process. 

  • European Parliament vote

Once the Council of the European Union has voted and given its green light, the deal must be approved by the European Parliament. If a majority of MEPs votes against  the agreement, it fails. Public pressure is key to mobilise Members of the European Parliament from all political groups and countries. 

  • Court of Justice 

There is also a potential legal pathway for the deal to be considered by the  Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A member state or  the European Parliament can ask the Court for an opinion on whether the agreement is compatible with the EU treaties. If the CJEU finds that the agreement or parts of it contravene EU treaties (such as obligations under the Paris Agreement or the EU’s own climate laws), the agreement could not be adopted as it is .

  • Climate

The EU-Mercosur agreement doesn’t comply with EU climate obligations. It is expected to lead to an overall rise in greenhouse gas emissions, because of international transport but foremost deforestation, a major driver of carbon emissions through the destruction of carbon sinks. Lastly, the deal will increase imports to Mercosur countries of European motor cars, a climate non-sense.

The Paris Climate Agreement is now included as an essential clause in the EU-Mercosur agreement but the language on climate is actually weaker than in the agreements with New-Zealand or with the UK. As drafted, the essential clause applies only in cases where a party exits the Paris Agreement. But there is no sanction mechanism if a party doesn’t respect its climate targets under the Paris Agreement.

  • Deforestation 

The deal will boost exports of commodities that are the largest drivers of land-use change in South America. The Mercosur bloc already faces alarming deforestation linked to cattle ranching and other agricultural commodities. By reducing tariffs on these products, the deal would further incentivize forest destruction. 

Environmental provisions in the agreement are weak and unenforceable. There are no new commitments to reduce deforestation. There is only a weak intention to take measures to prevent further deforestation only after 2030, which is less ambitious than existing global commitments and a lower ambition than the current Brazilian government’s objective of achieving zero deforestation by 2030. In addition, it’s only a statement of intention, not a statement of outcome, thus no sanctions are possible in case of non compliance. 

Lastly, several provisions of the annex to the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapter will undermine the implementation of the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).

  • Pesticides

The deal will boost the trade and use of highly hazardous pesticides. Many of these chemicals are banned in the EU for health or environmental reasons but are massively exported to Mercosur countries, where they contaminate soil, water, and local communities. The crops treated with these agro-toxics are then imported back into the EU, introducing toxic substances into European food chains.

  • The annex to the TSD chapter and rebalancing mechanism 

The final EU-Mercosur text threatens the EU’s regulatory autonomy. The annex to the sustainability chapter gives Mercosur authorities direct influence over the monitoring of corporate due diligence obligations by EU institutions. In addition, the newly introduced ‘rebalancing mechanism’ allows Mercosur countries to sue EU member states for compensations if their exporters fear export losses due to EU legislations such as the Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) or the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). This mechanism could undermine various EU measures and create a regulatory chill.

The EU–Mercosur deal would expand the trade of agri-commodities linked to land grabbing, forced displacement, and violence against Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Peoples from Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina have warned that the deal would further undermine their rights to land, self-determination, and a safe environment, while rewarding the very companies responsible for violations.

Reports by Global Witness and Friends of the Earth document that Brazil and Paraguay are already among the deadliest countries for environmental and land defenders. Yet, the EU–Mercosur text lacks binding human rights clauses, effective enforcement mechanisms, or guarantees for the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples.

European farmers would face unfair competition from imports produced under lower environmental, sanitary, labor, and animal-welfare standards. 

The deal would open EU markets to large quantities of South American cheap agricultural products each year: 99,000 tonnes of beef, 180,000 tonnes of poultry, and 25,000 tonnes of pork. South American farmers can use pesticides and growth hormones that are banned in Europe. They also have lower labor costs and can farm on much larger scales. Brazilian beef, for instance, costs 20-30% less than European beef. EU farmers simply cannot compete with these prices while respecting higher standards.The European Commission claims that “safeguard measures” will protect farmers if there’s a problem. But these safeguards are almost impossible to activate in practice – they only work if imports increase by 10% and prices drop by 10% at the same time. Farmer organizations say these protections are ineffective and won’t help when they’re needed.

Many pesticides and chemicals banned in the EU are widely used in Mercosur countries. These toxic substances are often spread by planes and mix in “toxic cocktails”, creating considerable health risk for rural workers and communities living close to the plantations. The trade agreement will make it easier for products treated with these dangerous substances to enter the EU market, threatening consumers’ health.

Mainly large multinational corporations in agribusiness, chemicals, automotive, and the mining industries. Chemical giants like BASF and Bayer have actively lobbied for the deal, along with major automotive manufacturers. The powerful corporate lobby group BusinessEurope has argued that social and environmental standards “cannot supersede economics”. 

On the Mercosur side, large agribusinesses are expected to benefit from the deal. The world’s biggest meat company JBS, for instance, is estimated to be one of the main winners due to the agreement’s beef and poultry quotas. 

The agreement would entrench Mercosur dependence on raw-material exports, block diversification of the economy and reinforce deindustrialisation. In Argentina alone, 186,000 industrial jobs could disappear. This trade agreement perpetuates an unequal and neocolonial North/South trade relation.

EU-Mercosur talks have taken place largely behind closed doors, with minimal transparency nor parliamentary oversight. NGOs, trade unions, local communities have been excluded from the negotiations, while corporate lobbyists enjoyed privileged access to decision-makers. Lastly, the likely splitting of the agreement for the ratification process, is an undemocratic way to bypass national vetoes.

Yes. We can build fair, sustainable, and transparent trade systems that:

  • Support local economies and small producers;
  • Protect ecosystems and biodiversity;
  • Uphold labor and human rights;
  • Put climate and social justice before profit.

Trade can serve people and the planet, but only if it’s redesigned for cooperation, not exploitation.